Rethinking fast and slow based on a critique of reaction-time reverse inference by Krajbich, Ian Michael et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2015
Rethinking fast and slow based on a critique of reaction-time reverse
inference
Krajbich, Ian Michael; Bartling, Björn; Hare, Todd A; Fehr, Ernst
Abstract: Do people intuitively favour certain actions over others? In some dual-process research,
reaction-time (RT) data have been used to infer that certain choices are intuitive. However, the use
of behavioural or biological measures to infer mental function, popularly known as ‘reverse inference’, is
problematic because it does not take into account other sources of variability in the data, such as dis-
criminability of the choice options. Here we use two example data sets obtained from value-based choice
experiments to demonstrate that, after controlling for discriminability (that is, strength-of-preference),
there is no evidence that one type of choice is systematically faster than the other. Moreover, using
specific variations of a prominent value-based choice experiment, we are able to predictably replicate,
eliminate or reverse previously reported correlations between RT and selfishness. Thus, our findings
shed crucial light on the use of RT in inferring mental processes and strongly caution against using RT
differences as evidence favouring dual-process accounts.
DOI: 10.1038/ncomms8455
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-113355
Published Version
 
 
Originally published at:
Krajbich, Ian Michael; Bartling, Björn; Hare, Todd A; Fehr, Ernst (2015). Rethinking fast and slow
based on a critique of reaction-time reverse inference. Nature Communications, 6:7455. DOI: 10.1038/n-
comms8455
ARTICLE
Received 13 Jan 2015 | Accepted 11 May 2015 | Published 2 July 2015
Rethinking fast and slow based on a critique
of reaction-time reverse inference
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Do people intuitively favour certain actions over others? In some dual-process research,
reaction-time (RT) data have been used to infer that certain choices are intuitive. However,
the use of behavioural or biological measures to infer mental function, popularly known as
‘reverse inference’, is problematic because it does not take into account other sources of
variability in the data, such as discriminability of the choice options. Here we use two example
data sets obtained from value-based choice experiments to demonstrate that, after con-
trolling for discriminability (that is, strength-of-preference), there is no evidence that one type
of choice is systematically faster than the other. Moreover, using speciﬁc variations of a
prominent value-based choice experiment, we are able to predictably replicate, eliminate or
reverse previously reported correlations between RT and selﬁshness. Thus, our ﬁndings shed
crucial light on the use of RT in inferring mental processes and strongly caution against using
RT differences as evidence favouring dual-process accounts.
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U
nderstanding the processes behind decision-making is a
fundamental goal in the social, behavioural and cognitive
sciences. Across these literatures, one central question is
whether behaviour is the result of a slow and deliberative process
that carefully weighs the available options, or a more automatic
process that is quick but prone to certain biases. A prominent
view, often referred to as dual-process theory, is that both types of
processes contribute to human behaviour. In the context of
value-based choice, these two processes might favour different
alternatives and compete to determine the decision maker’s ﬁnal
choice. Thus, certain decisions may come to be thought of as
‘intuitive/automatic’ (Type I), while others may be labelled as
‘deliberative’ (Type II)1,2. The distinction is important because
deliberative processes should consider features of the choice
problem, while intuitive processes should be insensitive to choice
details. For example, giving money to a homeless person may be
seen as an automatic response to help others or as a calculated
action taken only when another is truly in need. Which
explanation is correct has major implications for understanding
human nature, and from a practical point of view for designing
institutions to encourage or discourage certain behaviours. It is,
therefore, crucial to identify ways to determine whether choices
are intuitive or deliberative.
It has been proposed that one way to distinguish between
intuitive and deliberative choices is to examine relative reaction
times (RTs), the logic being that a key feature of intuitive
processes is that they can be executed more quickly than
deliberative processes. Decisions produced by an intuitive process
should thus tend to have shorter RTs than those from a
deliberative process1,3. In recent years, several researchers have
used this relationship to reason backwards from RTs to infer that
fast decisions are intuitive4–16. However, there are well-known
pitfalls associated with making reverse inferences in other
domains17, and a similar argument applies to RT durations. In
short, there is a key distinction between the prediction that an
automatic process will occur faster than more deliberative
computations, and the classiﬁcation of a choice as intuitive or
automatic because it happens more quickly. It is well-established
that various cognitive processes contribute to RT and thus any
inference based on RT must account for these processes.
However, as noted above, claims relying on RT reverse
inferences are all too common in the decision science literature.
Again, the problem with claims based on RT correlations is that
there are multiple factors that can contribute to RT. Most
prominently, there is an extensive literature documenting
the relationship between discriminability and RT, ranging
from memory and perception18–25 to value-based/economic
choice26–39. For example, in the 1990s, a now-famous debate
arose over the use of RT to infer serial versus parallel visual search
processes40. During this debate several authors demonstrated that
discriminability was a key determinant of the observed RT effects,
thus undermining evidence for the alternative dual-process
accounts41,42. In the realm of value-based choice, decision
problems involving similar options tend to take a large amount
of time, while choices between dissimilar options generally take
less time26,29,30,33,35. Therefore, it is critically important to
consider the possibility that there may just be a single
deliberative process governing choices, and that variations in
RT are due to the perceived similarity of the choice options and
not competing processes (for related points in additional
domains, see41,43–46). In fact, if discriminability is not properly
accounted for in the experimental design and/or analyses,
RT asymmetries are almost guaranteed in any data set.
Here we illustrate this point in depth, using social-preference
and intertemporal choice paradigms, both contexts in which
others have inferred dual processes. Initially, we identify RT
asymmetries between one type of choice and the other, which
some might take as evidence for dual processes. However, after
controlling for the strength-of-preference between choice options
in these paradigms, we ﬁnd no evidence that one type of response
is any faster than the other. Based on these ﬁndings, we argue that
modifying the choice options appropriately can produce any
desired RT result (for example, fast or slow selﬁshness). We
demonstrate this experimentally by running a replication of a
public-goods experiment from a recent inﬂuential study by Rand,
Greene and Nowak5 (henceforth, RGN), but with two additional
choice problems that vary the personal cost of the pro-social act.
The three different cost levels in this data set replicate, eliminate
and reverse the originally observed RT asymmetries in RGN5.
These results clearly demonstrate that RT differences or
correlations should not be used as evidence for dual-process
theories.
Results
The RT reverse-inference problem. We know that RT in a choice
task depends critically on how different the decision maker ﬁnds
the options that she is considering47. This is true for both
perceptual and value-based decision-making. Here we will focus
on value-based decision-making. Consider an abstract choice
between two options A and B. If you were to plot the expected RT
as a function of the difference in subjective value (preference)
between A and B, you would ﬁnd that the curve peaks at a value
difference of 0, and falls off steadily as the strength of the
preference increases in either direction (Fig. 1a).
Now imagine an experiment where subjects make multiple
decisions, each time between an option from group A and an
option from group B. As a concrete example, one could imagine
an experiment designed to test whether people intuitively favour
Ale or Bourbon. In this experiment, subjects would make a series
of choices, each time between a different Ale–Bourbon pairing.
The experimenter has to make a decision about which Ales and
Bourbons to include in her experiment. Depending on which
items she selects, she may ﬁnd that the Ales she selected are
generally preferred to the Bourbons. Another experimenter,
running an otherwise identical experiment on the same
population, may select a different set of Ales and Bourbons and
ﬁnd that the Bourbons he selected are generally preferred to
the Ales.
The problem arises when these two experimenters compare
their RT results. Experimenter 1, having a majority of trials where
Ale is preferred to Bourbon, will likely have many instances
where there is a strong preference for Ale and relatively fewer
instances where there is a strong preference for Bourbon. This
would lead to generally faster Ale choices (Fig. 1b). On the other
hand, Experimenter 2 will likely have many trials where Bourbon
is strongly preferred and relatively fewer trials where Ale is
strongly preferred. This would lead to generally faster Bourbon
choices (Fig. 1c).
Based on their results, these two experimenters, having run
seemingly identical studies, would reach opposite conclusions
about whether people intuitively favour Ale or Bourbon in a fast,
automatic way.
One can apply the same logic to any choice task. For instance,
in cooperation-game studies, we can replace A and B with Selﬁsh
and Pro-Social. The same prediction would hold. If the
experiment is set-up in such a way that the pro-social options
are subjectively better than the selﬁsh options, then pro-social
choices will tend to be faster. But if the experiment is slightly
different, then selﬁsh choices may be more appealing and they
will tend to be faster.
There are two sources of variability in the relative attractiveness
of a choice category A relative to an alternative category B.
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The ﬁrst is due to idiosyncratic individual variability in
preferences. Some subjects may generally prefer A, while others
generally prefer B. If two experiments have different proportions
of these subjects, they may exhibit opposite RT effects. The
second source of variability is due to the choice problems selected
by the experimenter as outlined above. Thus for the same set of
subjects, one choice problem may strongly favour A, while
another choice problem strongly favours B. Returning to our
earlier example, one decision may be between a renowned craft
Ale and a bottom-shelf Bourbon, while another decision may be
between a generic, discount Ale and a top-shelf Bourbon.
In the following two experiments, one on social preferences
and one on time preferences, we demonstrate how variability in
individual preferences is systematically related to RT differences.
In the third experiment, an extension of the RGN public-goods
study, we demonstrate how variability in the choice problems also
affects RT differences.
Dictator game. In the Dictator Game experiment, subjects
(n¼ 25) in the role of the dictator made 70 binary decisions
between two allocations of money, each one specifying an amount
for the dictator and an amount for the receiver. For each choice,
there was a selﬁsh option and a pro-social option. Compared with
the pro-social option, the selﬁsh option gave more money to the
dictator and less money to the receiver.
We start by looking at RT purely as a function of choice type
(pro-social versus selﬁsh). We ﬁnd that subjects were faster when
choosing the selﬁsh option (mean median: 2,822ms) compared
with the pro-social option (mean median: 3,100ms, t(24)¼ 2.16,
P¼ 0.04) (Fig. 2a). On this basis we might conclude that selﬁsh
decisions are fast and intuitive, while pro-social choices are more
deliberative.
It is important to note that each trial has a different tradeoff
between what the dictator has to personally give up and how
much he beneﬁts the receiver by choosing the pro-social option.
In some trials the dictator has to give up very little in exchange
for a big gain for the receiver, but in other trials the dictator has
to give up a lot in exchange for a small gain for the receiver, while
a third type of trial falls somewhere in between. We refer to the
ﬁrst type of trials as ‘high-beneﬁt’ trials, and to the second type of
trials as ‘low-beneﬁt’ trials.
So far we have only discussed objective tradeoffs, that is, dollar
cost to the dictator versus dollar beneﬁt to the receiver. For any
given trial, these tradeoffs are identical across subjects. But of
course, subjects may differentially value money for themselves
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Figure 1 | Effect of experimental design on observed RTs. Here we show a standard relationship between reaction time (RT) and the strength-of-
preference between two options A and B. We assume that if the net preference for A is positive, A will be chosen over B, and vice versa. (a) If the
experimenter constructs choice problems by sampling symmetrically from the left and right side of the plot (that is, A and B are equally liked on average),
then A choices and B choices should on average take an equal amount of time. (b) If the choice set includes more options with a larger net preference for A
(blue shading), A will be chosen more often, and A choices will be faster on average than B choices. (c) Conversely, if the choice set favours options with a
larger net preference for B (red shading) B will be chosen more often, and B choices will be faster on average than A choices. (d) The difference in mean RT
between B and A choices as a function of the overall probability of choosing A. Each dot represents one simulated subject faced with choice options drawn
from either the blue shaded experiment where the net preference and probability of selecting A is greater or the red shaded experiment where the net
preference and probability of selecting B is greater. The dashed line indicates an RT difference of 0. We see that choice sets near indifference (that is,
P(choose A) ¼0.5) have small differences in RT between B and A choices. However, this difference in RT increases as the probability of choosing A
becomes more extreme (that is, closer to 0 or 1).
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compared with money for others. ‘Selﬁsh’ subjects place relatively
low value on money for others, while ‘pro-social’ subjects place
relatively high value on money for others. For any given trial, a
selﬁsh subject will thus be more likely to choose the selﬁsh option
than his pro-social counterpart.
Based on the arguments laid out above, we would expect that in
a given experiment a selﬁsh subject (that is, one who primarily
chooses the selﬁsh option in this experiment) would tend to make
faster selﬁsh decisions and slower pro-social decisions. The more
selﬁsh the subject is, the harder it will be for him to be pro-social.
Thus, more extreme selﬁshness will result in a larger difference
between pro-social and selﬁsh RTs. Similarly, a pro-social subject
(again deﬁned by his decisions in the experimental choice set)
would tend to make slower selﬁsh decisions and faster pro-social
decisions. That is, the more extreme the pro-sociality, the bigger
the gap between selﬁsh and pro-social RTs.
Turning to the data, we indeed ﬁnd a strong correlation
between a subject’s probability of choosing the selﬁsh option (that
is, his degree of selﬁshness) and the difference between his
median RT for pro-social and selﬁsh choices (r¼ 0.6, t(23)¼ 3.56,
P¼ 0.002) (Fig. 2b). Furthermore, note that at indifference
(P(choose selﬁsh)¼ 0.5) the difference between median RTs is
B0. In other words, if our experiment is perfectly designed to
make our subject choose each option half of the time (and with
equal vigour), then we should ﬁnd no difference in RTs. However,
such experiments are rare due to the fact that they must be
tailored to each individual.
In our experiment, the bias was clearly towards low-beneﬁt
trials because subjects chose the selﬁsh option 64% of the time,
yielding selﬁsh choices that were faster than the pro-social
choices. Thus, the RT difference observed in these experiments is
likely a result of the fact that subjects chose the selﬁsh option
more than half of the time.
To control for choice difﬁculty when examining RT, we applied
a well-established model of social preferences developed by
Fehr–Schmidt and later Charness–Rabin, to estimate each
subject’s preference for pro-social acts48,49. This utility function
allows us to convert each two-dimensional choice option (dictator
payoff and receiver payoff) into one subjective value. Speciﬁcally,
we use the following utility function:
U xi; xj
  ¼ 1 br asð Þxiþ brþ asð Þxj
where xi is the payoff to the dictator, xj is the payoff to the
receiver, r and s are dummy variables for whether the dictator’s
payoff is higher or lower than the receiver’s payoff, respectively,
and b and a are individually ﬁt preference parameters for each of
those contingencies, respectively. We can then use the difference
in utility between the chosen and unchosen options as an index of
the strength-of-preference.
Next, we analysed RTs as a function of both choice type (selﬁsh
versus pro-social) and the difference in utility between the two
choice options. Figure 2c displays two features of the data. First,
mean RT decreases as the utility difference increases, that is, as
one option becomes increasingly better than the other. Second, at
each level of utility difference, there is no difference in RT
between selﬁsh and pro-social choices. What drives the overall RT
difference in the data set is that there are simply more trials where
there was a high utility-difference advantage for the selﬁsh option.
To carefully test these observations, we conducted a mixed-
effects regression with log(RT) as the dependent variable
explained by independent variables for utility difference and a
dummy for pro-social choices. These regressions revealed
signiﬁcant effects of utility difference (t(1,740)¼ 7.37, Po0.001)
but no effect of the dummy for pro-social choice (t(1740)¼ 0.87
P¼ 0.38) on RT. In other words, the potential conclusion that
selﬁsh decisions are fast and intuitive is merely an artifact of the
parameters of the experiment. Once we correct for the strength-
of-preference in each trial, using utility differences, there is no
evidence that selﬁsh or pro-social choices take different amounts
of time.
Intertemporal choice. So far we have demonstrated that after
taking choice difﬁculty into account, our data show no difference
in RT for self-centered versus other-regarding choices. However,
claims of competing dual processes in decision-making are not
limited to the domain of social preferences. For example, some
have argued that different processes govern choices between
immediate and delayed rewards50–52 (but see the studies by Kable
and Glimcher53,54). If this were the case, one might expect to see
RT differences between such choices.
To investigate this possibility, we analysed a temporal-
discounting data set where 41 subjects made 216 binary choices
between $25 now and some larger amount x, t days in the
future55. In brain-imaging studies like this one, it is often
important to have a balanced design. In this study, subjects chose
the immediate $25 option on 53% of trials, which was not
signiﬁcantly different from 50% (t(40)¼ 0.88, P¼ 0.39). On that
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Figure 2 | Binary Dictator Game results. (a) The reverse-inference result: selﬁsh choices appear to be faster than pro-social choices, based on a
paired t-test of the mean, across subjects, of median reaction times (RT). (b) The difference in median RT between pro-social and selﬁsh choices as a
function of the overall probability of choosing the selﬁsh option. Each dot represents one subject and the dashed line is a regression line. We see that
uncommon choices take more time than common choices, and that for subjects who choose each option roughly half of the time, the difference in median
RT is close to 0. (c) RTversus utility difference, conditional on choice type. Utility difference is calculated as the difference in utility between the chosen and
unchosen options, using an individually ﬁt inequity-aversion model. After controlling for utility difference, there is no difference in RT between selﬁsh
(black) and pro-social (blue) choices. Bars represent s.e. across subjects (n¼ 25).
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basis, we should expect no signiﬁcant difference in RT for
immediate versus delayed choices. Indeed, we ﬁnd no difference
in RT for immediate choices (1,169ms) compared with delayed
choices (1,229ms, t(40)¼ 1.46, P¼ 0.15), though the difference
goes in the expected direction, with the slightly less-favoured
delayed choices being slightly slower.
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that the authors had
not been so careful with their design, or had, for instance, wanted
more trials where the immediate option would be chosen. Thus,
let us examine a subset of the full experiment, focusing on trials
where the immediate option is quite attractive compared with the
delayed option and so we would have predicted more choices of
the immediate option, based on median preferences reported in
previous experiments53 (see Methods).
In this reduced data set, we do ﬁnd an overall difference in RT
for immediate choices (1,152ms) compared with delayed choices
(1,257ms, t(40)¼ 2.22, P¼ 0.03) (Fig. 3a). On this basis we might
conclude, consistent with a large fraction of the literature, that
choices of the immediate payoff are fast and intuitive, while
choosing to wait for a bigger payoff is slow and deliberative.
However, just as in the social decisions, there is a strong
correlation between a subject’s probability of choosing the
delayed option and the difference in the median RT between
choices for the immediate and delayed options (r¼ 0.61,
t(39)¼ 4.79, P¼ 10 5) (Fig. 3b). In other words, impulsive
subjects take more time when they choose the delayed option,
while patient subjects take more time when they choose the
immediate option. The overall RT effect in the reduced data set is
simply due to the fact that there are many more trials where
choosing the immediate option is easy for everyone (compared
with easy-delayed trials), and so choices of the immediate option
are more common (68%) and faster.
As in the Dictator Game analysis, we next applied a model of
temporal discounting to control for strength-of-preference when
analysing RTs. To do so, we converted the delayed reward into its
present discounted value, using the standard hyperbolic-
discounting function:
U x; tð Þ ¼ x
1þ kt
where k is a subject-level parameter (ﬁt to each subject using a
maximum likelihood procedure, see methods) that determines
how much he discounts future rewards. We then used the
difference between the discounted subjective value of the delayed
option and the value of the immediate option ($25) as an index of
strength-of-preference.
We next analysed RTs as a function of both choice type
(delayed versus immediate) and the difference in value between
the two choice options. Figure 3c displays the same two features
of the data that we observed in the Dictator Game experiment.
First, mean RT decreases as the value difference increases, that is,
as one option becomes increasingly better than the other. Second,
at each level of value difference, there is no difference in RT
between delayed and immediate choices.
These observations are again supported by a mixed-effects
regression analogous to the one computed for the Dictator
Game, which shows a signiﬁcant effect of value difference
(t(5,576)¼ 9.27, Po0.0001) on log(RT), but no effect of choice
type (immediate versus delayed) (t(5,576)¼ 0.24, P¼ 0.81). Note
that the results are analogous when analysing the full data set.
Arbitrary generation of RT asymmetries. Recently, a high-
impact study by RGN claimed that human altruistic cooperation
is governed by a dual-process mechanism that pits a fast and
intuitive system favouring cooperation against a slow, calculating
system favouring selﬁshness5. This claim was based on the results
of several social cooperation experiments (prisoners’ dilemma
and public-goods games (PGG)) conducted by the authors. In the
PGG experiments that are the primary focus of their main text,
subjects were anonymously assigned to groups of 4 and each was
given an endowment of 40 money units (MU). Subjects then
decided how many MUs to keep, and how many to contribute to
the public good. Any contributed MUs were doubled by the
experimenter and split evenly among the four group members.
Thus, each subject in the group received 0.5MU for each 1MU
contributed by a group member.
In their original study, RGN found that subjects who
contributed less to the public good responded more slowly, while
faster responders contributed more MUs. The authors interpreted
these ﬁndings as suggesting that intuitive responses are more
cooperative (that is, pro-social) and used these ﬁndings to
motivate additional experiments using priming and time inter-
ventions as more direct tests of the pro-social tendencies
suggested by the RT correlations. Moreover, in subsequent work
they and others have developed a more elaborate theory
specifying when and for whom intuition should favour
cooperation as opposed to selﬁshness8. In this regard, we wish
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Figure 3 | Intertemporal choice results. (a) The reverse-inference result: choices of the immediate option appear to be faster than choices of the
delayed option, based on a paired t-test of the mean, across subjects, of median RT. (b) The difference in median RT between immediate and delayed
choices as a function of the overall probability of choosing the delayed option. Each dot represents one subject and the dashed line is a regression line.
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to point out that the relationship between RT and strength-of-
preference does not preclude possible biases or tendencies
towards pro-social or myopic behaviour that might be
exacerbated by time pressure or priming, but it does prohibit
drawing conclusions about fast, intuitive decision mechanisms
based on RT correlations. We utilize the RGN style PGG as an
example here, not to argue against a tendency for pro-social
behaviour, but because the set-up of the game makes it very
simple to change the attractiveness of pro-social behaviour and
directly demonstrate the relationship between RT and strength-
of-preference.
The PGG is very similar to the previously discussed Dictator
Game. Each subject is faced with the following tradeoff: keep each
MU or keep 0.5 of each MU and give 0.5 to three other subjects.
Now imagine two alternative versions of their experiment, A1
which yields a beneﬁt of 0.9 MU per subject for each contributed
unit, and A2 which yields just 0.3 MU per subject for each
contributed unit. In A1, the purely selﬁsh option keeps 40 for
oneself and gives 0 to each of the three others, while the purely
pro-social option produces 36 for oneself and 36 for each of the
others. In A2, the purely selﬁsh option is the same as before, but
the purely pro-social option only produces 12 for one oneself and
12 for each of the others. Thus, in the ﬁrst setting, contributing is
minimally costly and maximally beneﬁcial to others, while in the
second setting contributing is very costly and minimally beneﬁcial
to others.
Using the terminology that we introduced earlier, A1 is a high-
beneﬁt choice problem, whereas A2 is a low-beneﬁt choice
problem. As in the Dictator Game, the prediction from the
strength-of-preference account is that in A1 the selﬁsh subjects
will be slow and indecisive while the pro-social subjects will be
quick and cooperative, whereas in A2 the pro-social subjects will
be slow and indecisive while the selﬁsh subjects will be quick and
uncooperative. On average, this will result in relatively fast
pro-social behaviour in A1, but relatively slow pro-social
behaviour in A2.
To test these predictions, we conducted a replication of the
RGN public-goods experiment, using their original beneﬁt level
(0.5 MU per subject for each contributed unit), as well as the two
alternative levels described above (0.9 MUs per subject and 0.3
MUs per subject). Each subject (n¼ 175) made three decisions
total, one for each beneﬁt level.
The dual-process and strength-of-preference accounts yield
different predictions in this experiment. On the one hand, the
dual-process account predicts that in all three versions of the
experiment we should see a negative correlation between RT and
contribution amount. On the other hand, we predicted that when
the overall contribution amount iso50% (contributing is the less
attractive choice) there should be a positive correlation between
RT and contributions, but when the overall contribution amount
is 450% (contributing is more attractive) there should be a
negative correlation between RT and contributions.
As expected from the literature56, varying the group beneﬁt
from the public good inﬂuenced subjects’ average contribution
rates, with subjects’ contributions increasing from 25% to 47%
(t(174)¼ 5.87, P¼ 10 8) to 63% (t(174)¼ 3.9, P¼ 0.0001) with
beneﬁts of 0.3, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively.
Consistent with the strength-of-preference predictions, the
quicker half of the subjects in the 0.3 MU per subject treatment
contributed less (14%) than the slower half (38%, t(158)¼ 4.49,
P¼ 10 5), while in the 0.9 MU per subject treatment the quicker
half of the subjects contributed more (70%) than the slower half
(58%, t(172)¼ 2.16, P¼ 0.03) (Fig. 4). For the original 0.5 MU
per subject treatment, we ﬁnd a trend towards signiﬁcance in the
opposite direction to RGN, namely that the quicker half of the
subjects contribute less (43%) than the slower half (53%,
t(169)¼ 1.54, P¼ 0.12).
Analysing the data another way, we ﬁnd a positive Spearman’s
correlation between RT and contributions in the treatment where
the beneﬁt is 0.3 (r¼ 0.34, P¼ 10 6), a marginally positive
correlation in the treatment with the beneﬁt of 0.5 (r¼ 0.1,
P¼ 0.18), and a negative correlation in the treatment with the
beneﬁt of 0.9 (r¼  0.15, P¼ 0.045).
From the strength-of-preference perspective, the discrepancy
between the RGN results and our results in the 0.5 MU per
subject treatment is not surprising because in the RGN data set
subjects contributed slightly 450%, predicting quick contribu-
tions, while in our data set the subjects contributed slightly,
though not signiﬁcantly o50% (t(174)¼ 1.17, P¼ 0.24),
predicting slower contributions.
To summarize, contrary to the dual-process prediction of a
negative correlation between RT and cooperation in all cases, we
observe a positive correlation between RT and cooperation in two
out of three treatments. Importantly, these seemingly mixed
results are perfectly consistent with the strength-of-preference
account.
Discussion
We have demonstrated a robust relationship between RT and
choice probabilities, and the importance of taking strength-of-
preference into account when making inferences based on RT
data. By controlling for subjective-value differences, we showed
that there were no RT differences between selﬁsh and pro-social
choices in a social-preference data set, and similarly that there
were no RT differences between patient and impatient choices in
a temporal-discounting data set. These ﬁndings highlight the
pitfalls of using RT correlations as support for dual-process
theories.
In the speciﬁc case of social preferences, our results help to
resolve a debate in the literature where some authors ﬁnd positive
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Figure 4 | Public-goods results. Analogous to RGN’s (Fig. 1a), we plot the
contribution amounts for the fast and slow half of the subjects, here based
on a median split within each experiment (n¼ 175 per experiment). As
predicted by the strength-of-preference account, with a small group beneﬁt
we see that the slow subjects contribute more (two-sided t-test, P¼ 10 5),
whereas with a large group beneﬁt we see the opposite; fast subjects
contribute more (two-sided t-test, P¼0.03). At the intermediate group-
beneﬁt level, we see a small trend towards signiﬁcance (two-sided t-test,
P¼0.12), which is to be expected based on the overall contribution rate just
slightly o50%.
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correlations between RT and pro-sociality, while others ﬁnd the
opposite. We argue that which response is faster will depend
critically on the parameters of the decision problem. If it is costly
to contribute, as in our low-beneﬁt treatment, then being selﬁsh is
the faster response, whereas if it is cheap to contribute, as in our
high-beneﬁt treatment, then being pro-social is the faster
response.
We want to emphasize again that these results are not
incompatible with the existence of a general bias towards pro-
social behaviour. Our arguments and results do not directly
address the use of data from time-pressure and priming
experiments or the debates surrounding those results5,8,57–66. In
the results presented here, we do ﬁnd a bias in the opposite
direction, with o50% contributions in two out of three of our
conditions. However, it is also important to note that the presence
of a choice-bias alone does not imply a dual-process mechanism.
Various single-process choice models including evidence
accumulation models and other forms of Bayesian updating
mechanisms explicitly allow for response biases in the choice
process while simultaneously accounting for RTs and the
inﬂuence of varying decision parameters (for example, different
group-beneﬁt levels) on choices25.
In summary, using decision timing to make inferences about
whether certain behaviours are governed by the fast and intuitive
component(s) of a dual-process model is problematic and often
misleading if the values of underlying choice options are not
properly accounted for. We have shown here that asymmetries in
RT between choice types in decision contexts often suggested to
involve competition between fast, intuitive and slow, deliberative
processes (for example, moral, social, and intertemporal) can be
explained by differences in the strength-of-preference or
discriminability between choice options. Our results highlight
the need for more careful treatment of RT data when adjudicating
between competing models of decision-making.
Methods
Dictator game experiment. The Dictator Game behavioural data is from a
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment conducted at the
University of Zurich’s Social and Neural Systems laboratory. Subjects (n¼ 30) were
asked to make a choice between two possible allocations of money, option X and
option Y, where there was a tradeoff between their own payoff and the receiver’s
payoff. Five subjects were excluded from the analysis because they always chose the
selﬁsh option precluding a comparison of RTs between the two choice types. The
data from the remaining 25 subjects is presented here. Subjects also completed 50
additional trials that did not include a tradeoff between self and other payoff and so
we do not analyse those trials here. All subjects gave written informed consent. The
study was approved by the ethics committee of the Canton of Zurich.
The choice problems were presented in a random sequence, and the subjects
were asked to make their decisions within 10 s. Subjects ﬁrst observed a screen that
announced the upcoming Dictator Game (‘Choose X or Y’), followed by a decision
screen that included the options X and Y. After the subjects made their choice
using a two-button MRI-compatible button box, a ﬁxation cross appeared in the
centre of the screen during the inter-trial interval. If the subject did not make a
decision within 10 s, then a choice was automatically made for the fair option and
the experiment moved forward to the inter-trial interval. Three trials were excluded
for failing to fall within this time limit. Inter-trial intervals varied between 3 and 7 s.
Prior to scanning, subjects read written instructions describing the task and the
payoff rules. Comprehension of the payoff rules and the treatment conditions was
tested by means of a control questionnaire. All subjects answered the control
questions correctly and thus knew that they played with anonymous human
interaction partners and that their decisions were treated in an anonymous way.
The overall payment to the participants consisted of a ﬁxed show-up fee (25 Swiss
Francs (CHF)) plus the payment from six randomly selected choice problems. On
average, participants earned 65 CHF (ranging from 55 to 79 CHF).
Temporal-discounting experiment. We analysed the choices and RTs from 41
individuals, a subset of whom (n¼ 27) were included in a previously reported fMRI
analysis55. The additional 14 subjects included here represent behavioural pilots
and subjects for whom the fMRI data could not be used. All subjects gave written
informed consent. The study was approved by Caltech’s Internal Review Board.
Subjects made 216 choices between getting $25 at the end of the experiment or
getting an equal or larger amount at a later date. The delayed offers ranged from
$25 to $54, with a delay from 7 to 200 days. Each trial began with an offer
presented onscreen. Participants were required to press a button within 3 s to
indicate whether or not they accepted the delayed reward being offered. Only the
varying delayed option was presented onscreen. A button press response resulted in
the termination of the offer screen, and the appearance of a feedback screen for
250ms displaying ‘Yes’, if the delayed offer was accepted, or ‘No’, if it was rejected.
The phrase ‘No decision received’ was displayed if the subject failed to respond
within 3 s (the mean no response rate across subjects was 2.6% of trials). Trials
were separated by a ﬁxation cross of random duration (uniform: 2–6 s). At the end
of the experiment, a single trial was randomly chosen and implemented: subjects
received the chosen option in addition to $50 (available immediately) for
participating in the study. All payments were made using prepaid debit cards given
to the subjects at the end of the experiment. This allowed us to make the delayed
payments available on the appropriate date, without requiring subjects to return to
the lab.
Hyperbolic-discounting model ﬁts. We estimated an individual discount
factor (denoted by k) for each subject using maximum likelihood estimation.
In particular, we assumed that subjects assigned value to the delayed options using
a hyperbolic-discounting function, in which the utility of x dollars with a delay
of t days is given by the equation:
U x; tð Þ ¼ x
1þ kt
We also assumed that the probability of accepting the delayed option is given by
the soft-max function
P Yesð Þ ¼ 1
1þ eb 25U x;tð Þð Þ
where b is a non-negative parameter that modulates the slope of the
psychometric choice function. In this formula the value of the constant reference
option is $25. Note that the ﬁts were performed using the full data set for each
subject.
Reduced data set. To produce the reduced data set, we utilized the same
hyperbolic-discounting function described above. To independently select a subset
of the trials with which to demonstrate our point concerning RT inferences, we
took the median k value (k¼ 0.01 per day) from a similar study on temporal
discounting53. We then removed all trials in which the utility of the delayed option
was o$25. This reduced the data set from 216 trials to 140 trials per subject.
Public-goods experiment. We recruited 204 non-economics students who had no
experience with PGG from the regular subject pool of the decision laboratory of the
Department of Economics at the University of Zurich, where the sessions took
place in May and June 2013. The sample size was chosen to roughly match the
sample size in RGN. All subjects gave written informed consent. The study was
approved by the ethics committee of the Canton of Zurich. The experiment was
computerized with the software z-Tree67. Subjects ﬁrst received general details
about the game, shown on the ﬁrst computer screen. On the subsequent decision
screens, subjects were told the respective group beneﬁt from the public good, and
how much they would earn if the others in their group contributed everything and
if they either contributed everything or nothing (as in RGN). They could then type
in an integer contribution from 0 to 40 points (2 points¼ 1 CHF) and then press
an ‘OK’ button on the screen. RT was calculated as the time from the onset of the
decision screen to the time that subjects clicked on the ‘OK’ button.
Each subject made three such decisions, one for each group-beneﬁt level
(0.3, 0.5 and 0.9 MU per subject), in a counterbalanced order. After all three
decisions, subjects were given two incentivized comprehension questions asking for
the efﬁcient contribution and the contribution that maximizes own earnings (as in
RGN). 175 subjects successfully answered both questions and the rest were
excluded from subsequent analysis.
At the end of the study, subjects were randomly assigned to groups of four and
paid according to their choices from one of the three randomly selected games.
This was the only time that subjects received any feedback about others’ choices.
The overall payment to the participants consisted of a ﬁxed show-up fee (10 CHF)
plus the payment from the randomly selected PGG. On average, participants
earned 27.55 CHF (ranging from 12.40 to 44.60 CHF). Sessions lasted for a little
less than 1 h, including the payment of the subjects.
Simulations. We simulated 20 ‘subjects’ for each experiment (Fig. 1b,c). For each
subject, we randomly selected a logit temperature parameter from a uniform dis-
tribution between 0.1 and 10, and we also randomly selected 20 choice trials from a
uniform distribution over the net preference values given in Fig. 1b,c, depending on
the experiment. We then determined the average probability of choosing A for that
simulated subject across its 20 choice trials. For each subject, we determined the
average RT for A and B choices by looking at each trial and multiplying the
probability of making either choice by the appropriate RT depicted in Fig. 1a–c.
We then computed the normalized sum of these weighted RTs across the 20 choice
trials, once for the A choices and once for the B choices.
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